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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1152 
_____________ 
 
NARINDER SINGH, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA No. A072-012-844) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Frederic Leeds 
_______________ 
 
Argued 
September 16, 2015 
 
Before:   FISHER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 4, 2015) 
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_______________ 
 
Nicholas J. Mundy   [ARGUED] 
16 Court Street 
Suite 2901 
Brooklyn, NY  11241 
          Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Matt A. Crapo 
Timothy Hayes 
Brendan P. Hogan 
Lindsay M. Murphy [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Narinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions 
for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
decision dismissing his appeal from an order of an 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concluding that he was both 
removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a) due to his lack of seven years of 
continuous residence in the United States.  We will deny the 
petition. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
 After entering the United States, Singh was granted 
asylum on July 1, 1993, and adjusted to lawful permanent 
resident status on June 1, 1994.  On September 14, 2000, 
Singh was convicted in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Florida of conspiracy to counterfeit 
passports, counterfeiting and using visas, and mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  He was also convicted of 
unlawful possession of forged, counterfeited, altered, and 
falsely made nonimmigrant United States visas in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1546.     
 
 Singh later departed the United States and re-entered, 
as relevant here, on January 20, 2003.1  In late October 2009, 
he applied for admission to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident.  He was instead detained by Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement on January 10, 2010.  On 
January 19, 2010, he was served with a notice of removal 
charging him as an inadmissible arriving alien because he had 
                                              
 
1 The government concedes that this entry was 
“procedurally regular” but alleges that it was “not 
substantively lawful.”  (Government Supp. Br. at 12.)  It 
appears that Singh was admitted in error, as his conviction 
should have rendered him inadmissible.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (alien convicted of crime involving 
moral turpitude is inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (lawful permanent resident alien must 
seek admission if he has committed crime involving moral 
turpitude). 
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committed a crime involving moral turpitude, namely his 
2000 counterfeiting conviction.2   
 After being served with his notice of removal, Singh 
appeared for a master calendar hearing before the 
                                              
 2 The Notice to Appear stated: 
  
 The Service Alleges that you: 
 1. You are not a citizen or national of the 
United States; 
 2. You are a native of INDIA and a citizen of 
INDIA; 
 3. On June 1, 1994, you were accorded Lawful 
Permanent Resident status  of the  United States. 
 4. On or about September 14, 2000, you were 
convicted at the United States District Court, Northern 
District of Florida for the offense of Conspiracy to 
Counterfeit Passports; Counterfeit and Use Visas and 
Commit Mail Fraud in violation of Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 371 under case number 4:00cr32-
004(S). 
 5. On or about September 14, 2000, you were 
convicted at the United States District Court, Northern 
District of Florida for the offense of Unlawful 
Possession of Forged, Counterfeited, Altered and 
Falsely Made Non-Immigrant United States Visas in 
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546 
under case number 4:00cr32-004(S). 
 6. On or about October 30, 2009, you arrived at 
Newark Liberty International Airport in Newark, New 
Jersey, and applied for admission  into the United 
States as a Lawful Permanent Resident. 
(AR at 517.) 
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Immigration Court in Newark, New Jersey.  Through counsel, 
he acknowledged proper service of the notice to appear, 
admitted all of the factual allegations therein, and conceded 
the sole charge of removability for his commission of a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  Singh subsequently filed an 
application for cancellation of removal, and, through counsel, 
“indicated that he would not be seeking any alternative forms 
of relief.”  (AR at 153.)   
 
 The IJ denied Singh’s application for cancellation of 
removal, in an interlocutory order, on the basis that Singh had 
not accrued the requisite seven years of continuous residence 
in the United States to make him eligible for cancellation of 
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  Thereafter, the IJ 
held a hearing to determine whether Singh had any other form 
of relief available to him.  Singh sought no such relief and, 
accordingly, the IJ issued a final decision on April 8, 2013, 
incorporating in full its prior interlocutory order.   
 
 On December 17, 2014, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
decision.  This timely petition for review followed.   
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II. DISCUSSION3 
 
 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 “In reviewing the merits of Petitioner’s claims, this 
Court reviews the agency’s conclusions of law de novo, 
‘subject to established principles of deference.’”  Mendez-
Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
These “principles of deference” include the deference owed 
to administrative agencies pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  See 
Wang, 368 F.3d at 349.  In general, the degree of deference 
owed to a BIA decision varies based upon the decision’s 
precedential value.  See De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 
F.3d 341, 348-51 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, the BIA decision was 
a single-member, non-precedential opinion.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(g).  Accordingly, we defer to its legal conclusions 
                                              
 3 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3).  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of 
jurisdiction over “any judgment regarding the granting of 
relief under section … 1229b,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), 
we have interpreted this provision to apply only with respect 
to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of 
removal.  See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 
178 (3d Cir. 2003).  Satisfaction of the continuous residency 
requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus 
subject to our review.  See Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 
F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 
585, 588 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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only insofar as they have the power to persuade.  See Mahn v. 
Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (“At most, these 
decisions are persuasive authority.”).4 
 
 B. SINGH’S ELIGIBILITY FOR CANCELLATION OF  
  REMOVAL 
 
 Singh is removable from the United States.  His 
counterfeiting conviction, as he correctly concedes, qualifies 
as a “crime involving moral turpitude” that renders him 
inadmissible, and thus removable, from the United States.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crime involving moral 
turpitude renders alien inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(A) (alien who was inadmissible at time of entry 
is deportable).  Crimes, like Singh’s, involving allegations of 
dishonesty or fraud fall well within the recognized definition 
of “crimes involving moral turpitude.”  See De Leon-Reynoso 
v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 635-36 (3d Cir. 2002); see also In 
re Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 1992) (“The offense 
of possession of counterfeit obligations of the United States 
                                              
 4 We decide the petition “only on the administrative 
record on which the order of removal is based,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(A), and defer to the administrative findings of 
fact as “conclusive[,] unless any reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).  When the BIA issues its own decision on 
the merits and not a summary affirmance, we review its 
decision, not that of the IJ.  Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 
584, 588 (3d Cir. 2009).  The BIA has a corresponding 
responsibility to review the IJ’s findings of fact only for clear 
error.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).  Singh has not alleged that 
either the IJ or the BIA erred in any of their findings of fact. 
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has also been held to involve moral turpitude since the statute 
includes the intent to defraud … .”). 
 
 Having conceded removability, the sole relief that 
Singh now seeks is cancellation of removal.  “[T]he alien 
shoulders the burden of showing that [he] is eligible for 
cancellation of removal.”  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 
185 (3d Cir. 2010).  For a lawful permanent resident to be 
eligible for cancellation of removal, he or she must satisfy 
three requirements: (1) show lawful permanent resident status 
for not less than five years; (2) demonstrate continuous 
United States residency for seven years after having been 
admitted in any status; and (3) establish that he has not been 
convicted of an “aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  
The parties agree that Singh meets the first and third 
requirements.  Singh also rightly concedes that his period of 
residence prior to the commission of his counterfeiting 
offense does not satisfy the seven-year requirement.  The sole 
disagreement here concerns whether Singh’s post-2003 time 
period – from the date of his re-entry on January 20, 2003 to 
the service of his notice to appear on January 19, 2010 – 
satisfies the seven-year requirement.5 
                                              
 5 As these dates make apparent, it is arguable that 
Singh fell one day short of satisfying the seven-year 
requirement, regardless of the other issues in the case.  Given 
the unique closeness of the timing in Singh’s case, the 
determination of timeliness depends upon how one counts a 
one-year period for the purposes of eligibility for cancellation 
of removal.  Compare United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 
1259-60 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying the “anniversary method,” 
in which “the last day for instituting the action is the 
anniversary date of the relevant act”), with Habibi v. Holder, 
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 To be eligible for cancellation, the alien must have 
“resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after 
having been admitted in any status.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2).  
The seven-year clock starts to run when the alien is 
“admitted” to the United States.  Such admission is defined as 
“the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after 
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).  “The 7-year clock of § 1229b(a)(2) 
thus begins with an alien’s lawful entry.”  Holder v. Martinez 
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2015 n.1 (2012) (emphasis in 
original).  When the continuity clock stops is governed by 
another subsection of the cancellation statute, termed the 
“stop-time rule.”  This rule provides that continuous 
residency periods end either “when the alien is served a 
notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title[;] or … 
when the alien has committed an offense … that renders the 
alien inadmissible … or removable … whichever is earliest.”  
8 U.S.C § 1229b(d)(1). 
                                                                                                     
673 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing the “calendar 
method,” in which years are measured as “consecutive 365-
day period[s] beginning at any point” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Here, unlike in the typical case, the choice 
of method actually matters: under the anniversary method 
Singh would fall one day short, and under the calendar 
method he would have one day to spare.  The only two cases 
cited by the parties, and the only two cases of which we are 
aware, relied upon the calendar method in the context of 
measuring an alien’s period of physical presence in the 
United States.  See Minasyan v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1224 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 
2004).  Because we deny Singh’s petition on other grounds, 
we need not choose between the two approaches. 
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 As Singh concedes, and as the BIA properly found, his 
2000 counterfeiting conviction was a clock-stopping event.  
Because of that conviction, both the IJ and BIA concluded 
that Singh could not begin a new period of continuous 
residence after his 2003 readmission.  By their reasoning, 
Singh’s commission of a crime involving moral turpitude not 
only stopped the clock as to his preceding period of 
residency, but permanently prevented the clock from ever re-
starting as to a later period of residency.  Singh challenges 
that conclusion. 
 
 In Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005), we 
recognized one situation in which the seven-year period could 
potentially re-start after commission of a clock-stopping 
crime.  The alien in that case, a native and citizen of Nigeria, 
entered the United States as a non-immigrant student in 1981, 
returned home to Nigeria, and then returned to the United 
States in 1983.  Id. at 586.  Upon re-entry, he was arrested for 
possession of marijuana, to which he pled guilty and received 
a sentence of five years’ probation.  Id.  He subsequently 
departed the United States and was readmitted on a student 
visa in 1984, and lived here without interruption thereafter.  
Id.  In 1997, he was charged with removability based on his 
failure to maintain his student status, per the terms of his 
student visa.  Id. at 586-87.  He sought cancellation of 
removal.  The BIA held, as it has here, that the commission of 
a clock-stopping offense “is not simply interruptive of the 
period of continuous physical presence, but is a terminating 
event, after which no further continuous presence can accrue 
for purposes of cancellation of removal.”  Id. at 587. 
 
 We reversed.  Although we emphasized that multiple 
circuits had deferred to the BIA’s determination that the clock 
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generally cannot start anew, we distinguished those cases on 
the basis that none “involved an individual who left the 
United States and reentered.”  Id. at 589.  We cited the alien’s 
re-entry as the “critical fact for restarting the clock,” id. at 
590, and drew a bright line between those who remain in the 
United States and those who re-enter after a clock-stopping 
event, rendering a seemingly-broad holding in favor of those 
who re-enter: “Where, as here, there is (lawful) reentry after a 
clock-stopping event (i.e., the commission of a controlled 
substance offense), the clock starts anew.”6  Id.  Despite that 
language, we noted that the case then at hand – unlike Singh’s 
– was “not about deporting an alien who had committed a 
crime” because the notice to appear “made no reference to 
Okeke’s alleged commission of the controlled substance 
                                              
 6 We would later criticize this reasoning in Nelson v. 
Att’y Gen., 685 F.3d 318, 325 (3d Cir. 2012), noting that 
“there is no sound logical justification for attaching such 
significance to departure from the country.”  That observation 
rings true.  Indeed, fact patterns like Singh’s and that in 
Okeke (i.e., an alien who has committed a clock-stopping 
offense and returned to the country through regular channels 
and remained for an extended period) should not exist, 
because the alien who re-enters the United States under such 
circumstances is actually inadmissible.  See supra n.1.  As the 
government admits, Singh did not sneak into the country; he 
was let in.  In Singh’s case, not only was his procedurally-
regular entry on January 20, 2003 substantively unlawful, but 
it also occurred while he was serving a term of federal 
supervised release (for his 2000 conviction).  The legal 
question presented – whether the continuity clock can re-start 
– only needs answering because of the erroneous admission 
of an inadmissible alien. 
 12 
 
offense.”  Id.  According to the notice he received, Okeke was 
removable, rather, because he had overstayed his student visa.  
The notice to appear did not allege removability on the basis 
of the crime that also stopped the clock, and the Okeke Court 
“expresse[d] no opinion” as to what effect the crime’s 
inclusion in the notice to appear would have had on its 
decision.  Id. 
 
 We addressed just such a circumstance in Nelson v. 
Attorney General, 685 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2012).  In that case, 
a native of Jamaica was admitted to the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in November 1994.  Id. at 319.  
Less than five years later, in 1999, he pled guilty to marijuana 
possession.  Id. at 319-20.  He later visited Canada for two 
days, and was then allowed to re-enter the United States, 
where he lived without interruption for the next eight years.  
Thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security filed a 
notice to appear alleging his removability on the basis of his 
1999 conviction.  He applied for cancellation of removal, 
contending that Okeke controlled.  Id. at 320.  The BIA 
disagreed, distinguishing Okeke on the basis of the factual 
distinction that Okeke itself had identified – that Nelson had 
been charged in the notice to appear with the very crime that 
also terminated his continuous residence.  Id.  We affirmed, 
holding that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute was 
reasonable and therefore entitled to Chevron deference.  Like 
the BIA’s decision here, our opinion in Nelson emphasized 
that the crime that terminated his period of continuous 
residence was the basis for the alien’s removal in that case, 
unlike in Okeke, in which the alien was removable because he 
had overstayed his student visa.  As the Okeke Court had 
expressly drawn that distinction in its opinion, Nelson held 
that the distinction would now be dispositive. 
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 The case at bar is controlled by Nelson.  Unlike the 
alien in Okeke, and like the alien in Nelson, Singh was 
charged in his notice to appear with being removable on the 
basis of his clock-stopping offense.  See supra n.2.  Singh 
does his best to analogize his case to Okeke – by citing his 
repeated re-entry into the United States and his lack of 
criminal record aside from his 2000 conviction – but neither 
of those factual distinctions was cited in Okeke or Nelson as 
any part of the basis of those decisions.  It was the contents of 
the notice to appear that formed the dispositive difference 
between Nelson and Okeke.  We are thus bound by Nelson, 
and the BIA’s holding to that effect merits deference.7  
                                              
 7 The BIA’s decision in Matter of Nelson, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 410 (BIA 2011), to which we then deferred in the 
controlling Nelson case, is not without its flaws.  For one, 
Matter of Nelson is troubling insofar as a three-member panel 
of the BIA imposed a stark limitation on a prior en banc BIA 
decision, In re Cisneros-Gonzalez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668 (BIA 
2004), which had left open the possibility that there might be 
other circumstances in which § 1229b might permit multiple 
periods of continuous residence.  See Matter of Nelson, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. at 414 n.4.  Even if the BIA panel was somehow 
free to limit its own en banc decision, it was still bound by 
the decision of this Court in Okeke, which broadly held that 
lawful re-entry after a clock-stopping event re-starts the 
seven-year clock.  See Okeke, 407 F.3d at 591.  As support 
for its holding, Matter of Nelson relied primarily upon two 
cases – In re Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236 (BIA 
2000) and Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 
2007) – neither of which involved an alien who left and re-
entered the United States, the critical fact underlying Okeke 
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 Because Nelson controls, Singh’s continuous residency 
clock stopped in 2000 when he committed his crime 
involving moral turpitude and could never re-start.  Thus, he 
could not begin to accrue a period of continuous residency 
when he re-entered the United States in 2003, and he is, 
                                                                                                     
that was also present in Cisneros.  See Matter of Nelson, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. at 413. 
 Also, by making any clock re-start dependent on the 
contents of a later notice to appear, Matter of Nelson hinges 
such a re-start on an event that may happen only many years 
after the re-entry at issue.  Applying the logic of Nelson (as 
we must), Singh’s clock did not re-start in 2003 only due to 
the contents of a 2010 notice to appear.  It would make more 
sense – and be more predictable – if the re-starting of the 
clock were instead contingent on events contemporaneous to 
re-entry. 
 Finally, it seems formalistic to differentiate between 
Okeke and Nelson on this basis when the aliens in both cases 
agreed that they had been convicted of crimes that rendered 
them removable.  The only real difference between them is 
that the alien in Okeke was actually in a legally worse 
position, since he had a second basis for removal (overstaying 
his student visa).  Under the reasoning of Matter of Nelson, it 
appears that the alien in Okeke only won because the typist of 
his notice to appear did not catch, or care to include, his 
conviction as a basis for removal.  It is odd to condition the 
satisfaction of the continuity rule – a rule designed to ensure 
that an alien has a sufficiently strong connection to the United 
States – on the diligence of the person writing the notice to 
appear rather than on the actual actions of the alien in 
question.  It would behoove the BIA to provide some clarity 
in this area. 
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accordingly, ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Singh’s 
petition for review. 
